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Equity Sell Disciplines across the Style Box 
 
Robert S. Krisch 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study examines the use of four major equity sell disciplines across the equity style box. Specifically, 
large-cap and small-cap securities are tested to see which of the four sell disciplines consistently produces 
the best portfolio returns. Data from the Plan Sponsor Network (PSN) are used to calculate each 
portfolio’s benchmark-adjusted return (BAR), information ratio, and Sharpe ratio. These ratios are used to 
evaluate sell discipline strategy based on each portfolio’s market capitalization and style focus. Three 
regressions are run for each BAR, information ratio and Sharpe ratio. The analysis is repeated for all four 
corners of the style box. The results show that there is not a specific sell discipline criterion that 
consistently produces the best portfolio performance. The majority of the regression results were not 
significant due the fact that the calculated p-value does not meet the minimum required significance level 
of 10%.    
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Equity Sell Disciplines across the Style Box 
 
Introduction 
There has been a great deal of attention over the years as to when to buy a stock, but not 
nearly as much about the decision to sell. Most investors follow conventional buy decision rules 
for stock purchases, including a bottom-up approach (choosing a single stock based on its 
attractiveness), top down approach (picking a stock starting with a macro-level analysis), and 
others. Although the sell decision is not stressed as much, it is at least equally important. The sell 
decision works in concert with the buy decision to determine whether an investor experiences a 
gain or loss. 
Investors who do use a sell discipline criterion to determine the best time to sell an 
investment typically establish them even before a stock is purchased. This is to lessen the chance 
that the investor’s emotions play a part in the sell decision. As defined in the Plan Sponsor 
Network (PSN) database, the six principal sell discipline criteria include Down from Cost, Up 
from Cost, Target Price, Valuation Level, Fundamental Deterioration, and Opportunity Cost. 
These six sell disciplines can be divided into two categories: objective and subjective 
approaches.  
There has not been extensive academic research on sell discipline, and data are available 
from only one source, PSN. PSN provides data on thousands of portfolios, including which sell 
discipline is used for each respective portfolio. Along with that, the database contains other 
information about the portfolios, such as portfolio returns and market capitalization (micro, 
small, medium, and large). 
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Sell Disciplines 
The six principal sell discipline criteria are as follows. 
1) Down from Cost – At the time of purchase, the portfolio manager specifies a maximum price 
decline that triggers a sale.  
2) Up from Cost – At the time of purchase, the portfolio manager specifies a maximum price rise 
that triggers a sale. 
3) Target Price – At the time of purchase, the portfolio manager specifies a price that represents 
full valuation; when the stock reaches this price a sale is triggered. 
4) Valuation Level – Depending on the portfolio manager’s proprietary valuation model score, if 
a stock becomes fully priced in the model, it must be replaced. 
5) Fundamental Deterioration – Depending on the portfolio manager’s ongoing due diligence, a 
belief that business or industry fundamentals are deteriorating warrants a sale, regardless of 
valuation. 
6) Opportunity Cost – Depending on the portfolio manager’s primary equity decision-making 
criterion, whenever a better stock becomes available, sell the current stock holding. 
 
Literature Review 
 Sell discipline research began with Faugere, Shawky, and Smith (2004). Faugere et al. 
examine the six sell discipline criteria, with two found to be standouts. Both fundamental 
deterioration and valuation level are found to be the best sell disciplines to use in bull and bear 
markets respectively. During bull markets, investors appear to be more successful (produce a 
higher Sharpe ratio) with the subjective criterion “fundamental deterioration.” During bear 
markets, investors achieved better performance using an objective sell discipline, “valuation 
level.” The “target price” criterion was found to be a close second in all situations. This finding 
serves as the prime empirical motivation for the present study’s first hypothesis, concerning “all 
stocks.” Performance measures used in the analysis include benchmark-adjusted returns, 
information ratios, and downside volatility. 
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In an ideal situation, an investor wants to buy a stock when there is good value and good 
growth potential. An equally important question becomes when to sell the stock. Bernstein 
(1993) advises investors to consider an earnings expectations life cycle as a clock. “From one to 
three o’clock there is bad growth, from three to six o’clock there is bad value, from six to nine 
o’clock there is good value and from nine to twelve o’clock there is good growth.” Clearly, 
investors want to buy in at six o’clock when there is good value and good growth left, and cash 
out when the stock hits the twelve o’clock mark to maximize any gains. If a good sell discipline 
is in place from the start of the investment process, the better the investor’s chance of selling 
close to the twelve o’clock mark, which will result in the maximum gains. 
 Choosing a sell discipline can be a challenge in itself, but then comes the need to 
maintain the discipline to implement it. Many investors who choose a sell discipline will get 
nervous about the news that comes out about their investments and sometimes sell prematurely. 
As Norris (2002) notes, this is due to the fact that investors fear failure (losing money) and have 
a strong desire for success, which means realizing a gain. Peter and Steven (2005) state that these 
desires produce a psychological bias known as the disposition effect (or trade disposition), in 
which investors realize their gains yet fail to sell losing investments. Investors who are able to 
avoid falling prey to the disposition effect increase their return potential. To prevent a trade 
disposition, investors should set strong sell disciplines and understand that realizing a loss is part 
of successful investing. Boyarshinov & Magdon-Ismail (2010) emphasize that successful 
investors must realize that they always have three options in front of them: buy, sell, or do 
nothing. Usually, an equity investor’s sell discipline will give them the answer because a strong 
sell disciplines will either trigger a sale or indicate when to continue holding. In short, a clear sell 
discipline rigorously followed helps to negate the disposition effect. 
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Johnson and Collins (2000) are perhaps the first researchers to mention sell discipline. 
They do so in the context of separately managed accounts (SMAs), which are a portfolio of 
assets under the management of a professional investment firm. Johnson and Collins note that, 
“Portfolio managers rely on high performance achieved through strong sell disciplines, low 
expenses, and tax efficiency. They use sell disciplines to assess fundamental strengths and 
weaknesses across the entire portfolio in order to achieve good returns.”  
 According to Elton, Gruber, & Blake (2014), studies show that after analyzing 2,627 
SMA’s over a ten-year span, it has been confirmed that even the worst indexes produced better 
returns than the average SMA. This is because indexes give an investor security through 
diversification in the market. In a sense, investing in an index is an effective sell discipline. An 
example of this is the Dow Jones Industrial Average. The Dow has the stocks it includes in its 
index determined by the editors of the Wall Street Journal. In determining these stocks, they use 
a subjective approach and constantly update the index. In a sense, a sell discipline is 
implemented into the Dow automatically due to this, so investors need not worry about when to 
sell specific stocks, only when to sell the index itself. In other words, the best returns are located 
in indexes in part due to this “automatic” sell discipline, but if an investor chooses to not invest 
in an index, it will be beneficial to implement and follow a sell discipline to achieve a good 
return.  
Another way to look at sell disciplines is how they can and should be implemented in the 
case of short positions. An investor who shorts a stock is attempting to realize a gain by betting 
that the stock price will decrease. A strategy that may be profitable is not merely to sell an 
investment, but to actually sell short based on a sell discipline criterion.  
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 This paper addresses the question of which sell disciplines produce the best performance 
for different types of US common stocks. It has long been documented that different types of 
equity securities experience disparate long-term return and risk characteristics. For example, 
Fama and French (1993) propose a three-factor asset pricing model that takes into account 
enduring risk premia on small-cap and value stocks. 
 More recently according to Fama & French (2007), small cap stocks with high positive 
returns tend to become large-cap stocks over time. This increase in size is due to size and value 
premiums of average stock returns. The trend is that growth stocks tend to have downward price-
to-book ratio convergence and value stocks tend to have an upward price-to-book ratio trend. Put 
simply, small-cap strategies will produce the highest returns due to value premiums, but it takes 
a skilled investor to capitalize on this.  
 Along with this, Peterson, Jachini, and Lam (2011) note that active management, 
disciplined investors, and small-cap strategies will produce the best returns. Specifically, active 
investors need to have strong sell disciplines in order to produce high returns. Peterson et al. 
further state that the most successful SMA managers documented a strong negative relationship 
between assets under management and future performance. This is due to the fact that an 
investment manager might have too many accounts under management and cannot properly 
attend to each one, which will hinder overall performance. Put simply, an investor should invest 
using small-cap strategies to achieve the highest gains, while not having too many accounts to 
manage. They must pick a few winning stocks in order to efficiently manage a productive 
portfolio and enforce their sell disciplines at the proper times. 
 Finally, additional evidence is provided by Christopherson, Ding, & Greenwood (2002), 
who note that during the 1990’s assets under management (AUM) increased dramatically. 
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According to Christopherson et al., investment managers specializing in small-cap stocks 
experienced dramatic asset growth and increasing returns. This was due to the fact that small cap 
stocks have a high ceiling for gains due to value premiums and investors can capitalize on them 
if an effective sell discipline is put into place.  
Hypotheses 
The main hypotheses for this study can be stated as follows. 
 
All Stocks 
H0: Target Price is not associated with the highest performance 
H1: Target Price is associated with the highest performance 
 
Across the Equity Style Box 
H0: The superior sell discipline criterion does not vary by fund type 
H1: The superior sell discipline criterion does vary by fund type 
 
 The first hypothesis for this study is that target price will be associated with the highest 
portfolio performance. This is motivated by the findings of Faugere, Shawky, and Smith (2004) 
because they noted that the target price sell discipline performed the second best in all economic 
conditions. Along with this, target price is an objective sell discipline, so there is less question on 
when to execute it. The target price sell discipline states that when a stock hits a certain price, a 
sale is triggered. Across the board due to target price’s objective approach, it is safe to predict 
that it will produce the most consistent performance. 
 The second hypothesis for this study is that the superior sell discipline criterion does vary 
by fund type. This paper’s study is designed to test if small cap stocks respond differently as 
compared to large cap stock with respect to sell discipline. According to Faugere, Shawky, and 
Smith (2004), the best sell discipline depends on the economic environment (fundamental 
deterioration for bull markets and valuation level for bear markets). In light of this study, it 
would be desirable for there to be a distinction between the most effective sell discipline for 
small cap and large cap stocks.  
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Data and Methodology 
In order to test both hypotheses stated above, data from PSN is gathered and refined. The 
goal of the data manipulation is to find portfolios that were classified as “value” or “growth” and 
utilize large or small market capitalization strategies. PSN has data on 18,443 portfolios, but only 
4,051 portfolios meet the requirements to be in the equity style box. 
Exhibit 1 shows the breakdown of the four corners of the style box used in this study. 
These four corners include; large market capitalization portfolios that invest in growth stocks 
(1390); large market capitalization portfolios that invest in value stocks (1396); small market 
capitalization portfolios that invest in growth stocks (639); and small market capitalization 
portfolios that invest in value stocks (626). Along with that, each corner of the style box is 
further broken down by sell discipline that each portfolio uses. Unfortunately, there was not 
enough data available for the up from cost and down from cost sell disciplines for their results to 
be considered significant, so those limited results were excluded from this study. 
 
Exhibit 1: Frequency Distribution for PSN Equity Portfolio Size, 2016 
	
Large	Capitalization	
(>$7	Billion)	
Small	Capitalization																
(>$500	Million	-	<$2	Billion)	
Grand	
Total	
Growth	 1390	 639	 2029	
Fundamental	Deterioration		 737	 385	 1122	
None	 35	 6	 41	
Opportunity	Cost	 37	 14	 51	
Target	Price	 82	 58	 140	
Valuation	Level	 180	 94	 274	
(Blank)	 319	 82	 401	
Value	 1396	 626	 2022	
Fundamental	Deterioration	 334	 155	 489	
None	 21	 10	 31	
Opportunity	Cost	 36	 10	 46	
Target	Price	 163	 97	 260	
Valuation	Level	 542	 278	 820	
(Blank)	 300	 76	 376	
Grand	Total	 2786	 1265	 4051	
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After all the data was groomed for inconsistencies, the final 4051 remaining portfolios 
had a benchmark-adjusted return (BAR), information ratio, and Sharpe ratio calculated. The 
benchmark-adjusted return was effortlessly calculated due to the fact that the finalized PSN data 
are broken down into benchmark-adjusted return for every month each portfolio was in 
existence. The only step needed for this calculation was to average the monthly returns for every 
portfolio. BAR shows the amount of risk each portfolio takes on compared to against a 
benchmark. Exhibit 2 shows the results for the annualized benchmark-adjusted return of the 
4,051 portfolios across the style box. 
 
Exhibit 2: Average Benchmark-Adjusted Returns (BAR) 
	
Large	Capitalization	
(>$7	Billion)	
Small	Capitalization																
(>$500	Million	-	<$2	Billion)	
Grand	
Total	
Growth	 9.76%	 9.93%	 9.81%	
Fundamental	Deterioration	 10.35%	 6.27%	 8.94%	
None	 12.62%	 27.32%	 15.17%	
Opportunity	Cost	 10.06%	 14.26%	 11.30%	
Target	Price	 8.78%	 9.11%	 8.91%	
Valuation	Level	 13.93%	 20.29%	 15.93%	
(Blank)	 6.15%	 14.82%	 7.89%	
Value	 8.96%	 7.61%	 8.53%	
Fundamental	Deterioration	 6.03%	 10.41%	 7.40%	
None	 10.79%	 -9.12%	 6.36%	
Opportunity	Cost	 9.04%	 6.69%	 8.56%	
Target	Price	 15.31%	 10.42%	 13.44%	
Valuation	Level	 8.49%	 4.44%	 7.07%	
(Blank)	 9.53%	 12.35%	 10.12%	
Grand	Total	 9.36%	 8.78%	 9.18%	
 
 
Using the benchmark-adjusted return, the information ratio is also computed. The 
information ratio is the average monthly BAR divided by the standard deviation of the monthly 
portfolio BAR’s. The information ratio is a measure of the risk-adjusted return of a financial 
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security, in the same spirit as the Sharpe ratio. Exhibit 3 contains the results for the information 
ratio for the 4,051 portfolios across the style box. 
 
Exhibit 3: Average Information Ratio 
	
Large	Capitalization	
(>$7	Billion)	
Small	Capitalization																
(>$500	Million	-	<$2	Billion)	
Grand	
Total	
Growth	 0.0581	 0.0689	 0.0615	
Fundamental	Deterioration	 0.0576	 0.0514	 0.0554	
None	 0.1127	 0.1327	 0.1162	
Opportunity	Cost	 0.0682	 0.0709	 0.0690	
Target	Price	 0.0469	 0.0701	 0.0562	
Valuation	Level	 0.0660	 0.0886	 0.0731	
(Blank)	 0.0524	 0.1239	 0.0668	
Value	 0.0581	 0.0642	 0.0600	
Fundamental	Deterioration	 0.0450	 0.0525	 0.0474	
None	 0.0642	 -0.0550	 0.0377	
Opportunity	Cost	 0.0706	 0.1322	 0.0833	
Target	Price	 0.0702	 0.1043	 0.0833	
Valuation	Level	 0.0538	 0.0511	 0.0528	
(Blank)	 0.0719	 0.0869	 0.0751	
Grand	Total	 0.0581	 0.0666	 0.0608	
 
 
The Sharpe ratio is the final performance measure computed. The Sharpe ratio is each 
investment’s average risk premium divided by its standard deviation of return. Essentially this is 
a measure of the portfolio manager’s effectiveness at creating wealth. For this calculation, the 
monthly rate of a 3-month T-bill is subtracted from the respective monthly return reported in 
PSN for each portfolio. Each portfolio’s monthly risk premiums are averaged in order to obtain 
the numerator of the Sharpe ratio. Then the standard deviation of the portfolio’s monthly return 
is used as the denominator of the Sharpe ratio. Exhibit 4 lists the results of these computations 
across the corners of the style box. 
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Exhibit 4: Average Sharpe Ratio 
	
Large	Capitalization	
(>$7	Billion)	
Small	Capitalization																
(>$500	Million	-	<$2	Billion)	
Grand	
Total	
Growth	 0.1057	 0.1269	 0.1124	
Fundamental	Deterioration	 0.1007	 0.1267	 0.1096	
None	 0.1417	 0.1379	 0.1412	
Opportunity	Cost	 0.1502	 0.1291	 0.1448	
Target	Price	 0.0913	 0.1222	 0.1044	
Valuation	Level	 0.1012	 0.1328	 0.1120	
(Blank)	 0.1158	 0.1221	 0.1170	
Value	 0.1425	 0.1545	 0.1463	
Fundamental	Deterioration	 0.1446	 0.1602	 0.1497	
None	 0.1069	 0.1264	 0.1131	
Opportunity	Cost	 0.1250	 0.1131	 0.1225	
Target	Price	 0.1380	 0.1631	 0.1473	
Valuation	Level	 0.1370	 0.1485	 0.1409	
(Blank)	 0.1609	 0.1653	 0.1618	
Grand	Total	 0.1241	 0.1407	 0.1293	
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Empirical Analysis 
 Exhibits 2, 3, and 4 show BAR, information ratio, and Sharpe ratio (shown above) are 
highlighted to show the highest performance for each corner of the equity style box. Upon initial 
review of the BAR, information ratio, and Sharpe ratio, there is no sell discipline that 
consistently shows the best overall returns. This is contrary to the initial hypothesis that target 
price would show the best overall portfolio return. Along with this, the best sell discipline does 
vary by fund type as the initial hypothesis stated, but it does not consistently show the same 
variations for the best returns across the three ratios computed.  
 In order to make sense of the significance of the BAR, information ratio, and Sharpe 
ratio, regressions are necessary. The regression specification involves using dummy variables for 
each of the sell disciplines. For these three ratios, specifically the ratio tested was input as the 
dependent variable and the independent variables were the four sell disciplines (dummy 
variables) tested minus one. The omitted class is “blank,” meaning the portfolio manager did not 
report to PSN if s/he used a sell discipline. Listed in Exhibits 5, 6, and 7 are output from the 
regressions run for the three ratios tested in this study. 
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Exhibit 5: Benchmark-Adjusted Returns (BAR) Regression Results 
BAR	Regression	Statistics	
	 	 	Multiple	R	 0.0304	
	 	 	R	Square	 0.0009	
	 	 	Adjusted	R	Square	 -0.0003	
	 	 	Standard	Error	 0.3884	
	 	 	Observations	 4259	
	 	 	F-Stat	 0.7853	
	 	 	p-value	 0.5601	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 			 Coefficients	 Standard	Error	 t	Stat	 P-value	
Intercept	 0.0948	 0.0133	 7.1112	 0.0000	
Fundamental	Deterioration	Overview	 -0.0144	 0.0165	 0.8688	 0.3850	
None	 0.0482	 0.0523	 0.9208	 0.3572	
Opportunity	Cost	 -0.0037	 0.0389	 0.0956	 0.9239	
Target	Price	 0.0195	 0.0233	 0.8357	 0.4033	
Valuation	Level	 0.0009	 0.0173	 0.0544	 0.9566	
 
  
Exhibit 6: Information Ratio Regression Results 
Information	Ratio	Regression	Statistics	
	 	 	Multiple	R	 0.0470	
	 	 	R	Square	 0.0022	
	 	 	Adjusted	R	Square	 0.0010	
	 	 	Standard	Error	 0.1891	
	 	 	Observations	 4258	
	 	 	F-Stat	 1.8803	
	 	 	p-value	 0.0943	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 			 Coefficients	 Standard	Error	 t	Stat	 P-value	
Intercept	 0.0729	 0.0065	 11.2284	 0.0000	
Fundamental	Deterioration	Overview	 -0.0205	 0.0081	 -2.5473	 0.0109	
None	 0.0114	 0.0255	 0.4461	 0.6555	
Opportunity	Cost	 -0.0035	 0.0189	 -0.1856	 0.8527	
Target	Price	 0.0005	 0.0114	 0.0453	 0.9639	
Valuation	Level	 -0.0094	 0.0084	 -1.1141	 0.2653	
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Exhibit 7: Sharpe Ratio Regression Results 
Sharpe	Ratio	Regression	Statistics	
	 	 	Multiple	R	 0.0505	
	 	 	R	Square	 0.0026	
	 	 	Adjusted	R	Square	 0.0015	
	 	 	Standard	Error	 0.1307	
	 	 	Observations	 4902	
	 	 	F-Stat	 2.5065	
	 	 	p-value	 0.0283	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 			 Coefficients	 Standard	Error	 t	Stat	 P-value	
Intercept	 0.1417	 0.0047	 30.3932	 0.0000	
Fundamental	Deterioration	Overview	 -0.0183	 0.0055	 -3.3118	 0.0009	
None	 0.0020	 0.0149	 0.1345	 0.8930	
Opportunity	Cost	 -0.0049	 0.0122	 -0.4014	 0.6881	
Target	Price	 -0.0115	 0.0075	 -1.5371	 0.1243	
Valuation	Level	 -0.0116	 0.0058	 -2.0008	 0.0455	
 
 
The regression results above have their p-values highlighted if they have a significance 
level of 5% or better. When looked at closely only the fundamental deterioration overview 
(FDO) sell discipline for information ratio, FDO sell discipline for Sharpe ratio, and the 
valuation level sell discipline for Sharpe ratio show significant results. Essentially this means 
that only these three results (two being FDO) can reliably be used when judging if there is a 
better sell discipline to implement. Specifically, for these three significant results, they were 
among the worst performers in their respective category, so they can be reliably distinguished as 
the worst sell disciplines to implement. 
To further explore these results, 12 more regressions are needed. Each of the four corners 
of the style box must have its BAR, information ratio, and Sharpe ratio tested through a 
regression for significance. Listed below are the 12 regressions across the style box. 
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Exhibit 8: Large Capitalization Growth Stock Regression Results 
Large	Cap	Growth	BAR	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	Regression	Statistics	
	 	 	Multiple	R	 0.0734	
	 	 	R	Square	 0.0054	
	 	 	Adjusted	R	Square	 0.0008	
	 	 	Standard	Error	 0.3294	
	 	 	Observations	 1095	
	 	 	F-Stat	 1.1782	
	 	 	p-value	 0.3178	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 			 Coefficients	 Standard	Error	 t	Stat	 P-value	
Intercept	 0.0615	 0.0203	 3.0256	 0.0025	
Fundamental	Deterioration	Overview	 0.0420	 0.0245	 1.7117	 0.0872	
None	 0.0647	 0.0783	 0.8266	 0.4086	
Opportunity	Cost	 0.0391	 0.0626	 0.6258	 0.5316	
Target	Price	 0.0263	 0.0459	 0.5729	 0.5668	
Valuation	Level	 0.0779	 0.0340	 2.2901	 0.0222	
	 	 	 	 	Large	Cap	Growth	Information	Ratio	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	Regression	Statistics	
	 	 	Multiple	R	 0.0571	
	 	 	R	Square	 0.0033	
	 	 	Adjusted	R	Square	 -0.0013	
	 	 	Standard	Error	 0.1551	
	 	 	Observations	 1095	
	 	 	F-Stat	 0.7119	
	 	 	p-value	 0.6145	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 			 Coefficients	 Standard	Error	 t	Stat	 P-value	
Intercept	 0.0524	 0.0096	 5.4803	 0.0000	
Fundamental	Deterioration	Overview	 0.0052	 0.0116	 0.4495	 0.6531	
None	 0.0603	 0.0368	 1.6358	 0.1022	
Opportunity	Cost	 0.0158	 0.0295	 0.5376	 0.5909	
Target	Price	 -0.0055	 0.0216	 -0.2542	 0.7994	
Valuation	Level	 0.0136	 0.0160	 0.8508	 0.3951	
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Large	Cap	Growth	Sharpe	Ratio		
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	Regression	Statistics	
	 	 	Multiple	R	 0.0724	
	 	 	R	Square	 0.0052	
	 	 	Adjusted	R	Square	 0.0013	
	 	 	Standard	Error	 0.1623	
	 	 	Observations	 1254	
	 	 	F-Stat	 1.3157	
	 	 	p-value	 0.2547	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 			 Coefficients	 Standard	Error	 t	Stat	 P-value	
Intercept	 0.1158	 0.0103	 11.194	 0.0000	
Fundamental	Deterioration	Overview	 -0.0151	 0.0120	 -1.2561	 0.2093	
None	 0.0259	 0.0301	 0.8614	 0.3892	
Opportunity	Cost	 0.0343	 0.0293	 1.1710	 0.2418	
Target	Price	 -0.0245	 0.0216	 -1.1338	 0.2571	
Valuation	Level	 -0.0147	 0.0162	 -0.9057	 0.3653	
 
  
Above are the three regressions for the large capitalization growth portion of the style 
box (all significant results are highlighted yellow). For large capitalization growth stock the only 
regression that showed significant results is the FDO sell discipline for BAR and the valuation 
level sell discipline for BAR. The levels of significance are 0.0872 and 0.0222 respectively. This 
is even more significant because the BAR for large cap growth stocks showed that valuation 
level produced the best return, so it can confidently be said that this result was accurate. 
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Exhibit 9: Small Capitalization Growth Stock Regression Results 
Small	Cap	Growth	BAR	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	Regression	Statistics	
	 	 	Multiple	R	 0.1682	
	 	 	R	Square	 0.0283	
	 	 	Adjusted	R	Square	 0.0184	
	 	 	Standard	Error	 0.3169	
	 	 	Observations	 495	
	 	 	F-Stat	 2.8491	
	 	 	p-value	 0.0151	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 			 Coefficients	 Standard	Error	 t	Stat	 P-value	
Intercept	 0.1482	 0.0390	 3.7997	 0.0002	
Fundamental	Deterioration	Overview	 -0.0855	 0.0431	 -1.9864	 0.0475	
None	 0.1250	 0.1632	 0.7658	 0.4442	
Opportunity	Cost	 -0.0056	 0.0962	 -0.0580	 0.9538	
Target	Price	 -0.0571	 0.0621	 -0.9199	 0.3581	
Valuation	Level	 0.0547	 0.0550	 0.9955	 0.3200	
	 	 	 	 	Small	Cap	Growth	Information	Ratio	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	Regression	Statistics	
	 	 	Multiple	R	 0.1157	
	 	 	R	Square	 0.0134	
	 	 	Adjusted	R	Square	 0.0033	
	 	 	Standard	Error	 0.2248	
	 	 	Observations	 495	
	 	 	F-Stat	 1.3271	
	 	 	p-value	 0.2512	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 			 Coefficients	 Standard	Error	 t	Stat	 P-value	
Intercept	 0.1239	 0.0277	 4.4794	 0.0000	
Fundamental	Deterioration	Overview	 -0.0726	 0.0305	 -2.3762	 0.0179	
None	 0.0088	 0.1157	 0.0757	 0.9397	
Opportunity	Cost	 -0.0530	 0.0682	 -0.7774	 0.4373	
Target	Price	 -0.0538	 0.0440	 -1.2219	 0.2223	
Valuation	Level	 -0.0353	 0.0390	 -0.9060	 0.3654	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	 	 	
18 
	
Small	Cap	Growth	Sharpe	Ratio	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	Regression	Statistics	
	 	 	Multiple	R	 0.0290	
	 	 	R	Square	 0.0008	
	 	 	Adjusted	R	Square	 -0.0079	
	 	 	Standard	Error	 0.1152	
	 	 	Observations	 578	
	 	 	F-Stat	 0.0963	
	 	 	p-value	 0.9927	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 			 Coefficients	 Standard	Error	 t	Stat	 P-value	
Intercept	 0.1221	 0.0154	 7.9301	 0.0000	
Fundamental	Deterioration	Overview	 0.0046	 0.0165	 0.2753	 0.7832	
None	 0.0158	 0.0495	 0.3196	 0.7494	
Opportunity	Cost	 0.0070	 0.0367	 0.1903	 0.8492	
Target	Price	 0.0000	 0.0220	 0.0021	 0.9983	
Valuation	Level	 0.0107	 0.0197	 0.5435	 0.5870	
 
 
Above are the three regressions for the small capitalization growth portion of the style 
box (all significant results are highlighted yellow). The only significant results include the FDO 
sell discipline for BAR and FDO sell discipline for information ratio. Their levels of significance 
according to their p-values are 0.0475 and 0.0179 respectively. These two values do not match 
the best sell discipline for this portion of the style box, but they do offer supporting evidence that 
they are indeed not the top sell discipline for this section of the style box. 
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Exhibit 10: Large Capitalization Value Stock Regressions 
Large	Cap	Value	BAR	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	Regression	Statistics	
	 	 	Multiple	R	 0.0763	
	 	 	R	Square	 0.0058	
	 	 	Adjusted	R	Square	 0.0011	
	 	 	Standard	Error	 0.3397	
	 	 	Observations	 1058	
	 	 	F-Stat	 1.2312	
	 	 	p-value	 0.2922	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 			 Coefficients	 Standard	Error	 t	Stat	 P-value	
Intercept	 0.0953	 0.0226	 4.2155	 0.0000	
Fundamental	Deterioration	Overview	 -0.0350	 0.0314	 -1.1139	 0.2656	
None	 0.0126	 0.0936	 0.1347	 0.8929	
Opportunity	Cost	 -0.0048	 0.0692	 -0.0700	 0.9442	
Target	Price	 0.0579	 0.0385	 1.5045	 0.1328	
Valuation	Level	 -0.0104	 0.0279	 -0.3718	 0.7101	
	 	 	 	 	Large	Cap	Value	Information	Ratio	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	Regression	Statistics	
	 	 	Multiple	R	 0.0528	
	 	 	R	Square	 0.0028	
	 	 	Adjusted	R	Square	 -0.0020	
	 	 	Standard	Error	 0.1976	
	 	 	Observations	 1057	
	 	 	F-Stat	 0.5880	
	 	 	p-value	 0.7093	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 			 Coefficients	 Standard	Error	 t	Stat	 P-value	
Intercept	 0.0719	 0.0131	 5.4735	 0.0000	
Fundamental	Deterioration	Overview	 -0.0269	 0.0183	 -1.4725	 0.1412	
None	 -0.0078	 0.0544	 -0.1424	 0.8868	
Opportunity	Cost	 -0.0014	 0.0402	 -0.0340	 0.9729	
Target	Price	 -0.0017	 0.0224	 -0.0772	 0.9384	
Valuation	Level	 -0.0181	 0.0162	 -1.1171	 0.2642	
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Large	Cap	Growth	Sharpe	Ratio	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	Regression	Statistics	
	 	 	Multiple	R	 0.0927	
	 	 	R	Square	 0.0086	
	 	 	Adjusted	R	Square	 0.0046	
	 	 	Standard	Error	 0.1101	
	 	 	Observations	 1255	
	 	 	F-Stat	 2.1631	
	 	 	p-value	 0.0559	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 			 Coefficients	 Standard	Error	 t	Stat	 P-value	
Intercept	 0.1609	 0.0073	 21.9745	 0.0000	
Fundamental	Deterioration	Overview	 -0.0163	 0.0097	 -1.6860	 0.0920	
None	 -0.0540	 0.0263	 -2.0546	 0.0401	
Opportunity	Cost	 -0.0358	 0.0202	 -1.7707	 0.0769	
Target	Price	 -0.0228	 0.0116	 -1.9737	 0.0486	
Valuation	Level	 -0.0239	 0.0088	 -2.7253	 0.0065	
 
 
Above are the three regressions for the large capitalization value portion of the style box 
(all significant results are highlighted yellow). The only significant results for these regressions 
are located in the Sharpe ratio regression. All sell disciplines tested show levels of significance 
and are as follows: FDO 0.920, none 0.0401, opportunity cost 0.00769, target price 0.0486, and 
valuation level 0.0065. Put simply, this means that all values reported under the Sharpe ratio 
section of this regression are significant and show supporting evidence that managers that did not 
report a using a sell disciple produced the best portfolio returns. On the flip side, it also shows 
supporting evidence that all other sell disciplines in this portion of the style box according to 
Sharpe ratio did not produce the best portfolio returns.  
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Exhibit 11: Small Capitalization Value Stock Regressions 
Small	Cap	Value	BAR	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	Regression	Statistics	
	 	 	Multiple	R	 0.0493	
	 	 	R	Square	 0.0024	
	 	 	Adjusted	R	Square	 -0.0079	
	 	 	Standard	Error	 0.7315	
	 	 	Observations	 488	
	 	 	F-Stat	 0.2344	
	 	 	p-value	 0.9473	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 			 Coefficients	 Standard	Error	 t	Stat	 P-value	
Intercept	 0.1235	 0.0937	 1.3181	 0.1881	
Fundamental	Deterioration	Overview	 -0.0194	 0.1166	 -0.1663	 0.8680	
None	 -0.2147	 0.3776	 -0.5685	 0.5699	
Opportunity	Cost	 -0.0566	 0.2919	 -0.1938	 0.8464	
Target	Price	 -0.0193	 0.1265	 -0.1522	 0.8791	
Valuation	Level	 -0.0791	 0.1053	 -0.7511	 0.4530	
	 	 	 	 	Small	Cap	Value	Information	Ratio	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	Regression	Statistics	
	 	 	Multiple	R	 0.1352	
	 	 	R	Square	 0.0183	
	 	 	Adjusted	R	Square	 0.0081	
	 	 	Standard	Error	 0.1812	
	 	 	Observations	 488	
	 	 	F-Stat	 1.7960	
	 	 	p-value	 0.1121	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 			 Coefficients	 Standard	Error	 t	Stat	 P-value	
Intercept	 0.0869	 0.0232	 3.7444	 0.0002	
Fundamental	Deterioration	Overview	 -0.0344	 0.0289	 -1.1903	 0.2345	
None	 -0.1419	 0.0935	 -1.5174	 0.1298	
Opportunity	Cost	 0.0454	 0.0723	 0.6274	 0.5307	
Target	Price	 0.0174	 0.0313	 0.5567	 0.5780	
Valuation	Level	 -0.0358	 0.0261	 -1.3731	 0.1704	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	 	 	
22 
	
Small	Cap	Value	Sharpe	Ratio	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	Regression	Statistics	
	 	 	Multiple	R	 0.0982	
	 	 	R	Square	 0.0096	
	 	 	Adjusted	R	Square	 0.0010	
	 	 	Standard	Error	 0.0952	
	 	 	Observations	 579	
	 	 	F-Stat	 1.1157	
	 	 	p-value	 0.3507	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 			 Coefficients	 Standard	Error	 t	Stat	 P-value	
Intercept	 0.1653	 0.0124	 13.3318	 0.0000	
Fundamental	Deterioration	Overview	 -0.0051	 0.0147	 -0.3453	 0.7300	
None	 -0.0389	 0.0341	 -1.1421	 0.2539	
Opportunity	Cost	 -0.0522	 0.0341	 -1.5324	 0.1260	
Target	Price	 -0.0022	 0.0160	 -0.1354	 0.8923	
Valuation	Level	 -0.0168	 0.0137	 -1.2284	 0.2198	
 
 
Above are the three regressions for the small capitalization value portion of the style box. 
All three regressions for this part of the style box did not show any sign of significance for all 
sell disciplines tested. For this corner of the style box, the evidence of the three regressions 
supports that there is no clear sell discipline that produces the best portfolio returns for small 
capitalization value stocks.   
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Conclusion 
 Overall, this study had ambiguous findings due to the fact that there is not clearly one 
superior sell discipline that appears as superior across the four corners of the equity style box. 
The four corners of the style box include: large-cap growth portfolios; large-cap value, small-cap 
growth, and small-cap value. 
 One hypothesis of this study predicted that the target price sell discipline would produce 
the highest and most consistent portfolio return according to BAR, information ratio, and Sharpe 
ratio. Across the style box, the evidence shows that target price was not the best overall sell 
discipline to implement. The only time target price is shown to be the top sell discipline criterion 
was using BAR as a measure for the performance of large-cap growth portfolios. Even in this 
case, the p-value for the estimate coefficient for target price is 0.1328, indicating insignificance. 
 Along with this, the other hypothesis of this study suggest that sell discipline would vary 
by fund type, but this variation is not consistent across the style box. Specifically when BAR, 
information ratio, and Sharpe ratio for every fund are calculated the best sell discipline is 
different for each of the three ratios. In addition to this, only 9 of the possible 216 results are 
significant across the 12 style boxes according to the regression results. 
 In conclusion, the PSN data do not suggest that there is a superior sell discipline that 
every investor should implement to maximize his or her portfolio performance.  
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